Review ArticleOpen Access

Measuring the Strength of the Evidence

Volume 6 - Issue 4

**David Trafimow¹* and Michiel de Boer²**

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- 1Department of Psychology, New Mexico State University, Mexico
- ²Department of Health Sciences, VrijeUniversiteit Amsterdam, Netherlands
*Corresponding author: David Trafimow, Department of Psychology,New Mexico State University, Mexico, Las Cruces, NM 88003-8001

Received: June 02, 2018; Published: July 11, 2018

DOI: 10.26717/BJSTR.2018.06.001384

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Abstract

Many proponents of p-values assert that they measure the strength of the evidence with respect to a hypothesis. Many proponents of Bayes Factors assert that they measure the relative strength of the evidence with respect to competing hypotheses. From a philosophical perspective, both assertions are problematic because the strength of the evidence depends on auxiliary assumptions, whose worth is not quantifiable by p-values or Bayes Factors. In addition, from a measurement perspective, p-values and Bayes Factors fail to fulfill a basic measurement criterion for validity. For both classes of reasons, p-values and Bayes Factors do not validly measure the strength of the evidence.

Keywords: p-value;Bayes Factor; Strength of the Evidence; Auxiliary Assumption; Reliability; validity